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Most evaluations of novel authentication mechanisms have been 
conducted  under  laboratory  conditions.    We  argue  that  the 
results of short-term usage under laboratory conditions do not 
predict  user  performance  “in  the  wild”,  because  there  is 
insufficient time between enrolment and testing, the number of 
authentications  is  low,  and  authentication  is  presented  as  a 
primary task, rather then the secondary task as it is “in the wild”.  
User  generated  reports  of  performance  on  the  other  hand 
provide  subjective  data,  so  reports  on  frequency  of  use,  time 
intervals, and success or failure of authentication are subject to 
the vagaries of users’ memories. Studies on authentication that 
provide objective performance data under real-world conditions 
are rare. In this paper, we present our experiences with a study 
method  that  tries  to  control  frequency  and  timing  of 
authentication,  and  collects  reliable  performance  data,  while 
maintaining ecological validity of the authentication context at 
the  same  time.    We  describe  the  development  of  an 
authentication server called APET, which allows us to prompt 
users  enrolled  in  trial  cohorts    to  authenticate  at  controlled 
intervals,  and  report  our  initial  experiences  with  trials.  We 
conclude  by  discussing  remaining  challenges  in  obtaining 
reliable performance data through a field trial method such as 
this one. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 10 years, research into usable security mechanisms 
has  increased  significantly,  and  much  of  this  research  has 
focused  on  authentication  mechanisms.  Adams  &  Sasse  [1] 
collected  user  reports  on  the  impact  of  the  number  and 
complexity of passwords through a web survey and interviews.  
Zvrian  &  Haga  [21]  investigated  the  user  performance  with 
cognitive passwords  in the lab.  Since then, there has been a 
steady  increase  in  studies  investigating  the  performance  of 
password schemes and alternative authentication mechanisms by 
themselves or in a comparative way.   
 
User  performance  with  novel  graphical  authentication 
mechanisms has been a particular focus of interest: 
 
·  Dhamija & Perrig [8] investigated user performance 
with passwords and Déjà Vu, where users pick their 
choice of computer-generated images. They found that 
authentication performance with Déjà Vu was better 
than passwords. Renaud [17] extended this work with 
a study that found that hand drawn ‘doodles’ are 
superior to computer selected images and personal 
photos are unsuitable for use in a security setting. 
·  Perfomance of Passfaces – a system where users pick 
“their” face from 4 panel of 9 faces each - has been the 
subject of many studies, including Brostoff & Sasse 
[3], Monrose & Reiter [16] and Everitt et al [11].  [3] 
found that user reports of Passfaces were positive, but 
login frequency was significantly lower than with 
passwords, because participants felt that the longer 
login time meant it was not worth to login in for brief 
sessions .  [16] found systematic biases in the 
selection of images, which means the Passfaces 
selected were vulnerable to guessing attacks. [11] 
found that the introduction of a second Passfaces login 
(comparable to having a second password)  caused 
memory interference, leading to a significantly 
increased number of failed logins. 
·  The Passpoints system – where users click on a series 
of points within an image - was developed and tested 
by Wiedenbeck at al. [20].  They reported that – even 
though authentication performance was better than 
passwords, the time required to enroll and authenticate 
took longer. Chiasson et al. [4] also examined click-
based graphical password systems finding that field 
performance was worse than lab trials had suggested 
(although they concluded it was still adequate in terms 
of usability. They also found that image selection affects performance and graphical passwords suffer 
from interference affects. 
·  De Angeli et al. [7] compared user performance of two 
graphical authentication mechanisms to replace PINs. 
Neither authentication time nor recall performance of 
the graphical methods tested were better than PINs, 
but the authors attribute this to poor design of the user 
interaction, and suggested that better design graphical 
authentication would have potential.  
·  Dunphy & Yan [10] developed and tested BDAS, an 
image-based version of of the drawmetric system 
Draw-a-secret.  They found that BDAS produced 
significantly more secure drawmetric passwords, with 
no decline in authentication performance. 
·  Tao & Adams [19] adapted the game of Go to create 
Pass-Go. In an extensive study they found that by 
using intersections rather than cells the password 
space was increased without compromising usability. 
·  Chiasson et al. [5] have conducted a study on 
Persuasive Cued Click Points (PCCP), an image-based 
authentication system where users click on points in a 
series of images.  They found that recall performance 
was better for PCCP than for passwords, and the login 
speed with PCCP not significantly longer - and this 
was the first time that a graphical authentication 
mechanism achieved this. 
·  Davis et al. [6] examined graphical passwords based 
on the Passface system and found that user choice 
leads to predictable passwords with such low entropy 
that that system is in their view insecure. 
 
Whilst these studies did produce valuable insights into user 
interaction  on  with  authentication  mechanisms, 
performance  results  are  anything  but  conclusive.  Having 
examined the way in which the studies were conducted, we 
argue  that  the  results  are  not  a  valid  predictor  of  user 
performance  with  such  mechanisms  “in  the  wild”,  as 
Dourish & Grinter [9] put it.   
 
With the exception of [3], [4], [6], [7], [17] and [19], all of 
the  studies  above  were  conducted  exclusively  under 
laboratory  conditions.  The  specific  reasons  why  we  feel 
that performance results have to be treated with caution are 
as follows: 
 
1.  User performance is usually tested only once 
after successful enrolment; often quite often, 
within the same session as enrolment.  This 
means the time-span between enrolment and 
authentication is rather short. 
2.  In [10], participants were re-tested after one 
week, and in [8] and [18], after two weeks.  
Testing authentication performance after a longer 
interval provides a better insight into 
memorability for infrequently used mechanisms, 
but does not provide much insight into 
authentication performance in regular use. The 
criteria for what is usable authentication are 
different for frequently and infrequently used 
credentials. With frequent authentication (once a 
day or more), recall of the credential becomes 
automatic for most users, and fast execution 
becomes a priority. Execution times largely 
depend on the number of interaction steps, the 
response time of the system, and whether correct 
execution of the recalled credential is difficult 
(e.g. typing errors; note that execution errors are 
generally lower with frequent use, but some 
credentials present execution problems for some 
users even with frequent use .With infrequent 
authentication (once a week or less), most users 
have difficulties recalling the credential correctly, 
so  fast execution is  less important for 
performance than the ability to recall the 
credential correctly. 
3.  Only in [11], a subset of users performed more 
frequent authentication - again over 2 weeks. 
Arguably, this is a sufficient period to test 
performance with frequent authentication; but at 
the same time, it is not long enough to provide 
meaningful predictions of performance with 
infrequent usage. 
4.  In all of the above studies, authentication was the 
primary task; in real-world interactions, 
authentication is a secondary task performed in 
the context of a production task [18].  The 
production goal is the focus of user behavior,  
and they are interrupted on their path to the goal 
by the - secondary - authentication task.  For a 
valid test of performance (and, for that matter, 
user satisfaction), authentication be tested in the 
context of a primary task.. 
5.  A final point is that the numbers of participants 
in these trials is generally low – typically 40 or 
less – and in many cases, they are students.  
Small samples sizes and over-reliance on students 
as participants means that the results cannot be 
generalized to performance of other users. 
 
[4] Also concluded that relying on solely on lab studies can be 
problematic after comparing results from lab and field studies. 
In  [3]  authentication  frequency  dropped  significantly  in  the 
Passfaces  cohort because authentication took  too long for the 
primary task – answering multiple-choice questions for course 
credits, which students typically did in 5 minute sessions,  [3] 
produced  a  large  set  of  objective  performance  data  under 
conditions  that  replicated  usage  “in  the  wild”  very  faithfully, 
and  [13]  logged  all  authentications  to  online  services  over  3 
months. Tao & Adams [19] also gathered data over a similar 
time  period  to  analyse  their  ‘Pass-Go’  authentication  system. The  data  gained  in  this  way  are  valuable  sets  of  objective 
performance  dates,  but  obtaining  ethical  clearance  for  such  a 
study requires significant effort and safeguards. 
 
Information about longer-term performance and user experience 
can, of course, be obtained from user reports, e.g. the password 
diary studies used in [13].  However, the data obtained in this 
way  are  subjective  and  affected  by  memory  effects;  without 
some objective data  for validation, they cannot be  taken as a 
reliable basis for predicting user performance.   
 
Our  aim  was to devise a data gathering approach that allows 
recruit large groups of participants for meaningful field trials of 
authentication  performance.   The studies must yield objective 
data on authentication performance, as well as subjective data 
on user experience with the authentication mechanism.  It must 
support trials in which a direct comparison of user performance 
with different authentication mechanisms can be made, and let 
researchers to control the frequency of authentication.  Finally, 
authentication should be performed as a secondary task, in the 
context of a meaningful production task.   This was the starting 
point  for  the  development  of  the  Authentication  Performance 
Evaluation Tool (APET). 
  
2.  THE APET SYSTEM 
APET  is  a  web-based  system  that  allows  authentication 
experiments to be set up and managed remotely. Participants can 
enroll  and  take  part  in  authentication  trials  over  any  Internet 
connection.  The  tool  is  split  into  two  major  components,  the 
core system and the authentication plugins. 
 
2.1  The Core 
At the heart of APET is an experiment management system tied 
to  a  database  of  participants.  A  researcher  can  log  into  the 
management side of the software and set up an experiment. At 
this  stage  they  can  specify  its  duration,  the  authentication 
mechanism involved in the experiment (from the current set of 
plugins),  the  attributes  they  wish  to  log  (from  a  selection 
specified  by  the  authentication  plugin,  see  below)  and  the 
participant  groups  they  wish  to  be  associated  with  the 
experiment.  New  participants  can  be  added  at  this  stage,  by 
submitting  their  email  addresses  through  a  CSV  file. 
Alternatively,  the  database  of  previous  participants  can  be 
searched and filtered by a variety of criteria - such as age and 
gender - or by more experiment-specific criteria - such as which 
studies  of  authentication  mechanisms  they  have  previously 
participated  in.  Multiple  groups  can  be  assigned  to  each 
experiment. This allows different conditions to be applied to the 
same  mechanism,  without  having  to  create  large  numbers  of 
experiments.  
 
Once  an  experiment  is  active,  the  researcher  can  email  the 
participants of their experiments. Drop-down menus allow the 
experiment  and  participant  group  to  be  selected  and  an 
(editable) message is then sent to the specified group containing 
a link to the APET system. It is via this link that the participants 
themselves interact with APET. Using any web browser from 
any location, they can follow the link to a page that will ask 
them for their email address. Once they have confirmed their 
address  (and  thus  that  they  are  taking  part  in  the  correct 
experiment) they will be shown a screen containing whichever 
authentication mechanism is being tested. Their performance is 
then logged to a data file that the experimenter can download at 
the  end  of  the  experiment.  The  participant’s  interaction  with 
APET is largely controlled by the authentication plugin. 
 
2.2  Authentication Plugin 
Each authentication mechanism used in APET needs to have its 
own plugin. This allows the system to be continually expanded 
as new technologies are developed without necessarily rewriting 
the  core  code.  The  plugin  controls  what  the  participants  see 
when  the  follow  the  link  emailed  to  them.  For  example  the 
password  plugin  can  be  configured  to  allow  or  disallow 
password resets, reminders or any other feature the experimenter 
wishes. Additionally the plugin specifies which logging options 
the  experimenter  has.  The  logging  options  can  be  added  or 
removed  during  the  set  up  phase.  The  function  of  the 
authentication mechanism cannot be modified at this time and so 
to  change  the  functionality  of  the  authentication  procedure  a 
new plugin would need to be created. Typical logging options 
are such attributes as the number of attempts the participant took 
to successfully authenticate, whether they requested a reset or 
reminder, and the time and date of the authentication attempt. 
Any attribute can be logged assuming it has been coded into the 
plugin. 
2.3  Primary Task Scenarios 
The final component of APET is the ability to host a number of 
different web services that provide the primary task for which 
participants  log  into  the  system.  APET  can  function  as  an 
authentication  service  for  live  web  services,  or  direct 
participants to pages that support other experimental scenarios.  
This  allows  us  to  create  different  primary  task  and 
authentication scenarios. The first primary task scenario we have 
implemented  is  Barterworld  –  an  online  marketplace  where 
members provide services to other members for credits, which 
can be used to buy other members services. Participants receive 
emails from another member with a confirmation code to claim 
services they have delivered – e.g. “Member 151 has confirmed 
you have completed 2 hours of gardening – please log in and 
enter  claimcode  70933  within  the  next  12  hours  to  have  the 
credit added to your page.” Participants are paid according to 
the numbers of hours they have logged on the website by the 
end  of  the  trial.  If  participants  fail  to  authenticate  within  3 
attempts, they receive a reminder of their credential, but have 
25% of an hour credit subtracted as a “fee” for the re-set. 
3.  CURRENT EXPERIMENTS 
APET  has  primarily  been  used  to  conduct  collect  data  on 
password  performance  over  time.  This  is  one  of  the  main 
strengths of the system. Without the need to bring participants 
into the laboratory (or for experimenters to travel to meet the 
participants) extended trials over time can be undertaken with 
relative ease. In this case the experiment ran over two periods of 
two  weeks.  The  participants  were  asked  to  enroll  with  a 
memorable password that confirmed to a  simple policy. They 
were  instructed  not  to  write  their  password  down  or  use  any 
other memory aids and to not register a password they used for 
any  other  system.  This  was  partly  for  their  own  security  but largely to attempt to avoid the influence of prior experience with 
the password on the experiment. 
 
For the first two week period the participants were sent an email 
once a day every working day (Monday to Friday) asking them 
to login to APET. The timing of the email varied through the 
two weeks. Email distribution is under the manual control of the 
experimenter  (as  opposed  to  being  an  automated  part  of  the 
APET  system)  so  the  precise  timing  of  the  emails  can  be 
managed as needed. The second two week block took place 6 
weeks  after  the  first  and  this  time  the  participants  were  sent 
emails  asking  them  to  login  three  times  a  week  (Monday, 
Wednesday and Friday). In each case the number of attempts 
taken to successfully log in and the number of password resets 
requested were logged to form the data set for the experiment. 
The entire experiment including recruitment and enrolment was 
run  remotely  over  the  internet.  At  no  time  were  the 
experimenters  face  to  face  with  the  participants  and  the 
participants  were  able  to  take  part  from  their  own  home  or 
workplace  as  suited  them.  This  meant  that  the  experimental 
tasks feel within their normal working practices and would have 
taken on a similar priority and level of intrusion as that of any 
other login procedure during their day. Certainly the intrusion 
and disruption level was substantially lower and more realistic 
than that a trip to a laboratory would entail. 
4.  FUTURE EXPERIMENTS 
As  well  as  including  the  Barterworld  primary  task  future 
experiments will focus on frequency  of authentication and its 
impact on performance. Subject cohorts will be asked to login 
with  varying  frequencies  varying  from  several  times  a  week 
through to once every 6-8 weeks. The aim of these experiments 
is to search for the point at which password resets become the 
norm  rather  than  recall  and  entry;  this  also  being  the  usage 
frequency  at  which  passwords  become  inappropriate  as  an 
authentication method. Additionally we are planning to use the 
APET system to investigate the effect of interference (both inter- 
and intra- authentication mechanism) on performance. As well 
as  the  password  plugin  we  will  be  using  plugins  for  a  PIN 
system and the Gridsure [2]. 
5.  PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS 
The  APET  system  has  proved  a  useful  vehicle  for  collecting 
objective data on user performance with different authentication 
mechanisms “in the wild” but there are some aspects that we 
cannot  control.  The  more  realistic  and  rewarding  the primary 
task  services  or  scenarios  are,  the  more  likely  it  is  that 
participants will want to make sure that they do not fail.  Despite 
being  very  clear  with  our  experimental  instructions  that 
participants  should  not  write  down  passwords  or  other 
authentication credentials, we cannot guarantee that participants 
will not do this, or undertake other behaviours that would affect 
their  performance  in  the  trial.  Additionally,  the  reliance  on 
plugins  reduces  the  flexibility  of  experimental design without 
expending time recoding them. However when weighed against 
the chance to test the performance of authentication systems in a 
far  more  natural  environment  we  believe  that  the  benefits 
overwhelmingly outweigh the costs. 
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